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Summary 
 
In high-risk industries such as aviation, the skills not directly related to technical 
expertise, but crucial for maintaining safety (e.g. teamwork), have been categorised as 
non-technical skills. Recently, research in anaesthesia has identified and developed a 
taxonomy of the non-technical skills requisite for safety in the operating theatre. 
Although many of the principles related to performance and safety within anaesthesia 
are relevant to the ICU, relatively little research has been done to identify the non-
technical skills required for safe practice within the intensive care unit. This review 
focuses on ICU critical incident studies in order to examine whether the contributory 
factors identified as underlying critical incidents are associated with the skill 
categories (e.g. task management, teamwork, situation awareness and decision 
making) outlined in the Anaesthetists’ Non-technical Skills (ANTS) taxonomy. The 
review found that a large proportion of the contributory factors underlying critical 
incident can be attributed to a non-technical skill category outlined in the ANTS 
taxonomy. This is informative both for future critical incident reporting, and also as 
an indication that the ANTS taxonomy may provide a good starting point for the 
development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for intensive care. However, the ICU 
presents a range of unique challenges to the practitioners working within it. It is 
therefore necessary to conduct further non-technical skills research, using human 
factors techniques such as root-cause analyses, observations of behaviour, attitudinal 
surveys, studies of cognition, and structured interviews to better understand the non-
technical skills important for safety within the ICU. Examples of such research 
highlight the utility of these techniques.  
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The Department of Health’s report on patient safety has encouraged healthcare 
providers in areas such as anaesthesia and intensive care medicine to emulate high-
risk industries, for example aviation and nuclear power, in the application of human 
factors research to enhance safety 9. In aviation, pilots’ skills not directly related to 
technical expertise, but crucial for maintaining safety are called non-technical skills, 
and include interpersonal skills such as communication, teamwork and leadership, and 
cognitive skills such as task management, situation awareness and decision-making 2, 
16
. Within the nuclear power and aviation industries, the specific non-technical skills 
important for protecting against errors have been empirically identified and trained 
through Crew Resource Management courses 41. During the last 20 years, the 
importance of non-technical skills for delivering safe and high-quality medical care 
has been increasingly recognised, if not explicitly addressed in medical training 31.  
More recently, research has begun to identify the specific non-technical skills 
important for safety in medical domains such as Anaesthesia and Surgery 15, 21, 25, 45. 
Each working environment has its own unique non-technical requirements. Although 
the principal skill categories may be generic and relatively transferable across 
domains 19, the component behaviours that demonstrate proficiency in those skills 
within a particular environment (e.g. the operating room) will be specific to the needs 
and characteristics of a domain 27, 31. Rall and Gaba 34 have pointed out that many of 
the principles related to performance and safety within anaesthesia are also pertinent 
to the ICU. The current article reflects on the relevance to the intensive care 
environment of the non-technical skills identified as being important for anaesthetists 
in the operating theatre.  
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The Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) behavioural marker system  
Within anaesthesia, a taxonomy of the non-technical skills important for safety in the 
operating theatre, called the Anaesthetists' Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) behavioural 
marker system, has been produced. This was developed from an analysis of data from 
critical incident reporting systems, attitudinal surveys, theoretical models, 
observations and the judgements of consultant anaesthetists 13, 35. The ANTS 
taxonomy has 15 skill elements in four categories with observable examples of good 
and poor behaviours that demonstrate non-technical skill proficiencies or deficits (See 
Figure 1). This can be used to structure non-technical skills training for anaesthetists 
17
, and the ANTS behavioural rating form can be used to assess anaesthetists’ non-
technical skills in theatre or in the simulator. For example, Yee et al 44 have shown, 
using the ANTS rating system in Canada, that taking part in anaesthesia crisis 
management courses results in an improvement in the non-technical skills of 
anaesthesia residents. While many anaesthetists are involved in intensive care 
medicine, the ANTS system was specifically designed to represent their non-technical 
skills in an operating theatre environment. To date, relatively little research has 
focussed upon identifying the non-technical skills important for protecting against 
human error in the ICU. However, studies examining human performance in the ICU 
have indicated the importance of non-technical skills such as teamwork and 
communication for safety and effective functioning 12, 22, 39.  
 
Within the intensive care literature there exist a number of data sources identifying 
common causal factors underlying critical incidents in the ICU. Frey et al 20 highlight 
the fact that ICU critical incident reporting systems provide a source of information 
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that can be used for quality improvement. However, a recent patient safety report 1 
points out that although lessons are learnt at a local level from UK incident 
monitoring systems, these improvements do not tend to be shared more widely. By 
using critical incident reporting data to identify behaviours that are commonly found 
to contribute to a critical incident, some insight can be gained into the non-technical 
skills important for safety in the ICU. The current article provides a summary of the 
non-technical skill factors commonly associated with critical incidents in published 
ICU studies. The emerging factors were compared to the non-technical skills 
categories and elements identified by the ANTS behavioural marker system to see if 
this provided a suitable fit. As the principles related to performance and safety within 
anaesthesia and the ICU are similar, the generic skill categories (e.g. teamwork) 
identified as being important for anaesthesia may also be important for the ICU, even 
though the setting and work tasks are different.  
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Method 
The identification of research articles involved a comprehensive search of the 
Medline, Biomed Central and Web of Knowledge Psychology databases for English 
language papers related to critical incidents and errors in the intensive care unit (see 
figure 2 for a flow diagram of the review methodology). Search terms were: Intensive 
care / non-technical skills / ICU / critical incidents / errors / adverse events. The 
search was limited to article titles and abstracts. Articles initially found (n=754) were 
scrutinised for possible inclusion through the relevance of their titles, and then 
abstracts. This left a total of 24 possible articles. The remaining articles were then 
filtered for inclusion if they met the criteria of: i) using data collected exclusively in 
the ICU; and ii) allowing for contributory factors referring to non-technical skills (as 
specified by the ANTS taxonomy) to be documented in the analysis of critical 
incidents. A total of 11 articles met these criteria, and were then analysed using the 
ANTS taxonomy 13. The ANTS behavioural marker system identifies four core 
categories of non-technical skills (see figure 2), each comprised of several elements, 
and for each element, exemplar component behaviours relevant to actual practice in 
anaesthesia 13, 14, 16. The four core non-technical skill categories include: 
Task Management: ‘Managing resources and organising tasks to achieve goals…’ 
Team Working: ‘Skills for working in a group context, in any role, to ensure 
joint task completion and team satisfaction…’ 
Situation Awareness: ‘Developing and maintaining an overall dynamic awareness of 
the situation based on perceiving the elements in the 
environment… understanding what they mean and thinking 
ahead…’ 
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Decision Making: ‘Making decisions to reach a judgement or diagnosis about a 
situation, or to select a course of action, based on experience or 
new information…’ 
 
Each article was reviewed in order to identify the contributing factors underlying 
incidents that were associated with non-technical skills. This was done by examining 
the individual contributing factors identified in each article, and then assessing 
whether they could be clearly identified as belonging to a particular non-technical 
skill category, as outlined in the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) 
handbook 16. Each contributory factor was classified according to the overall skill 
category to which it was found to refer. For example, contributory factors such as 
‘inadequate assistance’ would be classified as being indicative of teamwork skills, 
‘distraction or inattention’ would be classified as indicative of situation awareness 
skills, ‘errors of judgement’ as decision making skills, and ‘failure to check 
equipment’ as task management skills. If suitable numerical data were included in the 
article, the total number of contributory factors associated with non-technical skills 
was calculated, as was the proportion that each individual factor contributed (see table 
1). Furthermore, for all of the studies reviewed, the proportion of contributory factors 
that each of the four non-technical skill categories accounted for was calculated. To 
avoid a bias towards studies reporting large numbers of contributory factors, 
percentage data was used instead of raw data. This involved a 2-stage process; where 
for each study the total percentage of non-technical skill contributory factors that each 
skill category accounted for was calculated. These percentages were then aggregated, 
with the mean percentage of contributory factors identified as belonging to each non-
technical skill category being shown in figure 3. Lastly, the percentage of contributory 
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factors, out of all possible contributory factors, associated with non-technical skills 
was calculated (49%). The non-technical skill classification process was conducted by 
three applied psychologists familiar with the non-technical skills literature. The 
contributory factors underlying incidents were independently classified in terms of the 
non-technical skills outlined in the ANTS handbook. For all of the factors in Table 1, 
there was a 91% level agreement by at least 2 assessors for the underlying ANTS 
category, and 71% agreement by all 3 assessors. For factors where there was no initial 
agreement, the assessors collaboratively referred to the ANTS handbook in order to 
reach a final agreement on the underlying ANTS category. It is notable that the 
contributory factors documented in the critical incident studies do not document one 
single practitioner role in the ICU (i.e. the role of both nurses and doctors are 
considered), and thus at this stage, the analysis is not role specific. Furthermore, each 
factor does not refer to one incident, and thus a combination of factors may be 
underlying any single critical incident.  
 
Results and Discussion 
It can be seen from table 1 that a wide range of contributory factors associated with 
critical incidents can be accounted for by the non-technical skill categories outlined in 
the ANTS taxonomy. Overall, out of 2677 incidents and 5610 total contributory 
factors, 50% can be attributed to some form of non-technical skill deficit. These 
figures do not include the Hart et al 24 study as it does not provide numerical data on 
the contributory factors underlying incidents. Across all of the studies, Task 
Management was found to account for the greatest proportion of non-technical skill 
contributory factors (figure 3). The second greatest was Situation Awareness, the third 
greatest was Team Working, and the fourth greatest was Decision Making. However, 
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this breakdown is entirely constrained by the type of data the reviewed critical 
incident studies were designed to capture. For example, critical incident studies tend 
to vary in the different categories and types of data they collect, with some studies 
collecting very minimal non-technical skills related data. This may explain the high 
proportion of incidents associated with task management, as critical incidents studies 
tend to show a bias for capturing technical contributory factors related to task 
management skills, e.g. checking equipment, following protocols, inadequate 
preparation of patients. However, less provision may exist for capturing contributory 
factors associated with non-technical skills such as decision-making, e.g. failing to 
consider options, not asking others for suggestions, or being unwilling to revise 
courses of action in the light of new information.  
 
A further limitation of critical incident studies is that they lack a fine-grained analysis 
of the non-technical factors underlying incidents. In the current review, although 
contributory factors such as ‘errors of judgment’ and ‘failure to follow protocol’ may 
show face validity with skills such as ‘decision making’ and ‘task management’, the 
precise details underlying those factors cannot be ascertained. For example ‘errors of 
judgment’ may arise due to deficiencies in recognizing and understanding information 
(i.e. situation awareness), ‘and failure to follow protocol’ might arise due to a lack of 
supervision (i.e. teamwork/leadership). Also, a considerable number of contributory 
factors identified in the study were not possible to classify due to the underlying non-
technical skill not being obviously apparent. For example, factors such as ‘insufficient 
staff’ might be associated with task management, or may be more indicative of 
staffing policies.  Lastly, it can be seen that although the Hart et al. 24 study does not 
include numerical data, it does provide some supporting evidence for the relevance to 
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the ICU of the non-technical skills described in the ANTS taxonomy, as well as 
highlighting the utility of including numerical data when analysing accident 
causation.   
 
Despite the above issues, the current review does demonstrate that even though a 
variety of different contributory factors are captured by ICU critical incident studies, a 
large proportion of these can be attributed to the non-technical skill categories 
outlined in the ANTS taxonomy. This is both informative for the future development 
and use of data from critical incident reporting systems, as well as being indicative 
that the ANTS taxonomy may provide a good starting point for the development of a 
non-technical skills taxonomy for intensive care. However, it is also apparent that 
further research, using a range of techniques, is required for better identifying the 
non-technical skills necessary for maintaining safety in the ICU.  The ANTS system 
used several techniques to collect data regarding practice in anaesthesia in order to 
generate a non-technical skills taxonomy tailored for the anaesthetists’ role in the 
operating room 14. 
 
The techniques for gathering the basic skill set can include root-cause analyses, 
observations of behaviours in real-time and simulated environments, attitudinal 
surveys, studies of cognition, and structured interviews 2, 15, 26, 36. Each technique 
provides different forms of data. For example, root-cause analysis describes in detail 
the precise factors underlying critical incidents but can be limited to a specific 
scenario or procedure as well as the analysis procedure used to assess the incident. 
Observational approaches record behaviour as it occurs in a variety of conditions, for 
example during an emergency procedure, although it is difficult in real-life studies for 
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observers to capture all the events that occur within an environment, furthermore 
there is the potential for participant behaviours to be altered by the presence of a 
researcher. Attitudinal surveys highlight opinions on the importance of skills such as 
teamwork, and are informative about the social and organizational factors that affect 
perceptions of error and rule compliance, through generally do not provide specific 
information about the non-technical skills underlying good performance. Studies of 
cognition use experimental methods to model and understand the factors that affect 
cognitive processes (e.g. decision-making) within a particular environment, but are 
also susceptible to participant behaviours being altered by the experimental paradigm, 
e.g. the use of a low fidelity simulator. Structured interviews utilize the knowledge 
and experience of domain experts in ascertaining the non-technical skills required for 
coping with emergency and routine situations, although perceptions of confidentiality, 
and the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee, can affect the data 
obtained. 
 
The techniques described above could provide a rich source of non-technical skills 
information for the ICU, as well as providing useful examples for developing training 
materials.  Although research focussing on non-technical skills in the ICU is still very 
much in its infancy, there are examples of research within both the critical care and 
psychology literatures that have used the human factors techniques described above. 
Examples of such studies were found during the earlier literature search, and whilst 
not containing suitable data for inclusion in the critical incident review, are potentially 
informative and are therefore discussed below. Included in the following four sections 
are examples of human factors research using root-cause analysis, observational 
studies, studies of cognition, and attitudinal surveys, that have been found to yield 
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information regarding the non-technical skills required for safe practice in the ICU. 
Although the findings of such research does not explicitly describe in detail the non-
technical skills required for the intensive care environment, and are insufficient for 
developing a taxonomy of non-technical skills in the ICU, they do provide 
informative data with respect to validating and describing the relevance to the ICU of 
the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy. 
 
Root-cause analysis of ICU adverse events 
Root cause analysis identifies the fundamental causes of more serious critical 
incidents, and distinguishes the technical and non-technical contributory factors that 
originated from both the local and organisational environment. In particular, root-
cause analyses of adverse events in US ICUs published by Pronovost and colleagues 
32, 33
 underlined the importance of the non-technical skill category of team working, 
and specifically communication processes that support good team working, in the 
prevention of incidents. For example, in a case where a patient suffering hospital-
acquired pneumonia was accidentally given an undiluted medication 32, a lack of 
communication and understanding between an ICU doctor and trainee nurse for the 
medication handover procedure was identified as one of the main contributory factors. 
In another case, where a patient being treated for heart and renal failures suffered an 
air embolism after a large central venous catheter was removed whilst the patient was 
sitting up 33, one of the main contributory factors identified as underlying the incident 
was the reluctance of a nurse, who recognised that the catheter removal was being 
done incorrectly, to speak up and correct the trainee doctor conducting the procedure. 
Thus, root-cause analyses can provide non-technical skills information relating to 
both a particular situation, such as a lack of shared understanding for team member 
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roles in a specific procedure, or a more general aspect of teamwork, such as the need 
for open communication between doctors and nurses.  
 
Observational studies of ICU teams in real-life and simulators 
Non-technical skill competencies in the ICU can be further investigated through 
observational studies, which involves either observations of real-life environments, or 
of videotaped ICU scenarios that take place in medical simulators. Lighthall et al 28 
observed the performance of ICU staff on a training course which realistically 
simulates the intensive care environment and presents cases which challenge both 
medical and non-technical skills. Their analysis identified commonly occurring types 
of errors relating to the non-technical skill categories of situation awareness, decision 
making, teamwork and task management, and their specific impact upon the provision 
of care. Vigilance and fixation errors such as failing to recognise changes on 
monitors, not responding to ventilator alarms, and failing to periodically check patient 
status whilst placing a line, resulted in unrecognised deteriorations in the simulated 
patient condition. Judgement errors such as placing a catheter in a deteriorating 
patient, and being complacent with abnormal vital signs, resulted in inappropriate 
delays of therapy and clinical deterioration. Communication and task management 
errors such as failing to communicate priorities, overloading nurses with requests, and 
not following up inquiries on lab results resulted in insignificant tasks being done 
instead of key tasks, tasks not being done in a timely manner, and forgotten requests 
not being identified.  
 
A real-life observational study conducted by Donchin and colleagues 12 has also 
underlined the importance of detailing team competencies required for safe practice in 
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the ICU. The study investigated the nature and causes of errors in an Israeli ICU 
collected data over a period of 4 months, and involved observers noting all activities, 
interactions and errors that occurred around patient bedsides. Out of the 8178 
activities recorded, approximately 1% were erroneous, with doctors being found to 
commit around half of all errors despite being involved in just 4.7% of activities. In 
particular, team working problems were highlighted as being an important factor in 
the occurrence of errors, with verbal communication between nurses and doctors 
being reported in 37% of errors, despite being observed in only 2% of activities. 
Donchin and colleagues hypothesized that this may have occurred due to informal 
communication exchanges, and misunderstandings and misperceptions during 
communication. Therefore, observational studies in real-life and simulators can 
associate certain non-technical skills (e.g. team working) with measurable outcomes 
(e.g. errors), as well as understanding the causes and environments in which 
behaviours and errors occur. 
 
Attitudes towards non-technical skills in the ICU 
Attitudinal studies in the ICU have also focussed upon non-technical skills, with 
surveys in the US examining the attitudes of ICU staff with respect to teamwork and 
error. These studies have shown that the majority of both nurses and doctors feel that 
junior team members should be able to question senior members, and that decision-
making should include more team member input 38. However, it has also been found 
that more nurses than doctors report finding it difficult to speak-up in the ICU, and 
that fewer nurses than doctors report feeling that their input about patient care is well 
received, that disagreements in the ICU are properly resolved, and that teamwork 
between nurses and doctors is well coordinated 40. Furthermore, whilst the majority of 
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ICU staff acknowledge the importance of medical errors, they also report having 
difficulty in openly discussing mistakes due to factors such as the expectations of 
other staff members and negative personal implications 38. Thus, attitudinal studies 
can be useful in that they highlight the fact that a number of organisational factors 
may influence the use of non-technical skills such as teamworking in the ICU. For 
example a lack of perceived communication openness between nurses and doctors 
may make nurses reticent to become involved in patient care decisions, and the 
negative personal implications associated with discussing errors may result in the root 
causes behind errors not being identified and addressed.  
 
Studies of cognition in the ICU 
Studies of cognition in the intensive care unit have described the processes underlying 
decision making by ICU staff during their provision of care to patients. Decision-
making is a non-technical skill that has been researched by a number of psychologists, 
with studies examining whether expert decision-making in the ICU relies on similar 
cognitive processes to other complex work domains. Patel and Arocha 29 have studied 
decision-making processes by consultants in US surgical and medical ICUs, where 
caregivers face different problems. An analysis of audiotape transcripts from the 
morning rounds revealed that in the medical ICU (where it is necessary to diagnose 
patient conditions and then make treatment decisions) there was a tendency for 
decisions to be made using ‘backwards driven reasoning’. This involved developing a 
hypothesis about a situation and then testing and refining it against the available data 
before coming to a solution. By contrast, in the surgical ICU (where patients were 
recovering from a surgical procedure, and thus their diagnosis was better understood), 
decisions were found to be made through ‘forwards driven reasoning’. This involved 
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first gathering information about a situation and then recognising the solution from 
the perceived data. Likewise, Cesna and Mosier asked nurses how they would react to 
an emergency situation in the ICU 10. Expert nurses tended to immediately recognise 
the best solution for the situation. In contrast, less experienced nurses were shown to 
have a tendency to generate several options, with the best option not being generated 
first. In both studies, decision making was found to be consistent with recognition 
primed decision-making 30, a form of naturalistic decision making where an expert 
relies on their experience and knowledge to ‘pattern match’ or recognise a situation, 
and then recall a viable course of action without having to consider all the 
alternatives.  
 
Studies of cognition can be highly useful for understanding the processes underlying 
non-technical skills such as decision making, and whilst not providing a direct 
relationship between non-technical skills and safety, insight can be gained with 
regards to training and enhancing non-technical skills. For example, as expert 
decision makers are found to focus their attention on identifying situational features 
rather than choosing between options, training could focus on situation awareness 
skills such as altering scanning behaviours in accordance with patient conditions, and 
improving communication and cross-checking amongst team members so that 
information necessary for decision-making is shared immediately. Alternatively, less 
experienced decision makers could be trained to develop the mental models and 
patterns they require for recognising situations and associated solutions 43.  
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Conclusion  
The current review of contributory factors underlying critical incidents demonstrates 
an overlap between the non-technical skills requirements of the ICU and anaesthesia, 
with both domains having a need for good teamwork, situation awareness, task 
management and decision-making skills. This is consistent with other high-risk 
domains, such as aviation, where non-technical skill competencies for the same skills 
are recognised as being crucial for safe practice, and are taught through tailored 
training packages. Furthermore, to teach and reliably assess non-technical skills 
within a particular domain it is necessary to identify the component behaviours that 
demonstrate proficiencies of these skills within the domain 31. Each work environment 
has its own particular needs and characteristics, and the behaviours that demonstrate 
non-technical skill competencies within the ICU will be specific to the demands of 
intensive care medicine, as well as the roles and responsibilities of caregivers.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that it is necessary to further research the non-technical 
skill proficiencies required for safe practice in the ICU, and to describe them in 
sufficient detail so that they can be taught and reliably assessed. Ideally, as non-
technical skill training programmes are integrated with the technical aspects of a 
domain, training packages are implemented once professionals have an adequate level 
of technical competence. This also reduces the cognitive load of having to learn both 
technical and non-technical skills simultaneously. The current review demonstrates 
that the framework of non-technical skill categories identified in the ANTS taxonomy 
is also pertinent to the ICU, and thus provides a useful foundation for future 
investigations. Research using other investigation techniques, including root-cause 
analysis, attitudinal surveys, structured interviews, observational studies, and studies 
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of cognition, could facilitate a greater understanding of the non-technical skills 
required for supporting safety in the ICU. Although research focussing specifically on 
non-technical skill competencies for the ICU is limited, examples of research in the 
ICU using human factors techniques can be found to both support the importance of 
the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy, as well as 
providing examples of how such research can aid in identifying the non-technical skill 
competencies required for intensive care. Through using a combination of all the 
research techniques described, future work can better understand the nature and key 
challenges of the ICU environment, its’ non-technical skill requirements, the 
behaviours that demonstrate non-technical skill proficiencies, and the organizational 
factors that affect the quality of non-technical skills demonstrated by nurses and 
doctors in the ICU.  
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Figure 1. Anaesthetists Non-technical Skills Taxonomy 13, 14, 16. For more details please see the ANTS website  
(www.abdn.ac.uk/iprc/ants.shtml). 
 
E.g.  behavioural markers 
for poor practice 
E.g.  behavioural markers 
for good practice 
Categories Elements 
 
Task   Planning and preparing 
Management   Prioritising 
 Providing and maintaining standards 
 Identifying and utilising resources 
 
Team   Co-ordinating activities with team members 
Working   Exchanging information  
 Using authority and assertiveness 
 Assessing capabilities  
 Supporting others 
 
Situation  Gathering information 
Awareness   Recognising and understanding 
   Anticipating 
 
Decision  Identifying options 
Making   Balancing risks and selecting options 
   Re-evaluating 
− Reduces level of monitoring 
because of distractions 
− Responds to individual cues without 
confirmation 
− Does not alter physical layout of 
workspace to improve data visibility  
− Does not ask questions to orient self 
to situation during hand-over 
 
+ Confirms roles and 
responsibilities of team members 
+ Discusses case with surgeons or 
colleagues 
+ Considers requirements of others 
before acting 
+ Co-operates with others to achieve 
goals 
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Figure 2. Literature review flow diagram 
 
Stage 1: Initial Search 
 
Electronic Search:    Medline, Biomed Central and Web of Knowledge 
Keywords:                 Intensive care / critical incidents / ICU / error / adverse events / non technical skills  
Limitations:              Articles in English  
Results:                     754 articles 
Stage 2: Screening of results 
 
Filter:  Titles examined for relevance to the ICU, critical incidents and non-technical skills 
Filter: Relevance of abstract examined in order to assess information presented in the 
study 
Results:  24 articles 
Stage 3: Inclusion criteria 
 
Inclusion criteria 1:  Study has data collected quantative data exclusively in the ICU 
Inclusion criteria 2:  Study has allowed for non-technical skill causal factors associated with critical 
incidents to be documented 
Results:                      11 articles 
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Table 1: Non-technical skill contributory factors (as detailed by the ANTS taxonomy) identified in ICU critical incident studies   
 
Non-technical skill contributory factors 
 
Paper Identification Method 
No. of  
factors %  Contributory factors 
Associated  
ANTS Category 
      
Wright et al., 1991 
(42) 
Anonymous questionnaires 
(137 incidents and 97 
contributory factors 
reported)  
38 
 
 
63% 
13% 
10% 
8% 
3% 
3% 
Inexperience with equipment  
Failure to check equipment   
Failure to perform hourly checks   
Poor communication   
Not documenting changes  
Forgetting 
 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Situation Awareness 
Hart et al., 1994 
(24) 
Anonymous questionnaires 
(390 incidents ) 
 
NA Deficiencies in communication  
Failure to accept or adhere protocols 
Attention  
Distraction  
Reduced vigilance  
 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Situation Awareness 
Situation Awareness 
Situation Awareness 
Beckmann et al., 1996 
(3) 
Incident reporting forms 
(610 incidents and 1896 
contributory factors) 
701 
 
23% 
18% 
13% 
13% 
13% 
12% 
8% 
 
Error of recognition or anticipation  
Failure to follow protocol  
Communication  
Error of judgement 
Distraction / inattention   
Failure to check equipment  
Inadequate training  
 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Decision Making 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Buckley et al., 1997 
(8) 
Incident reporting forms 
(281 incidents and 658 
contributory factors) 
454 19% 
17% 
17% 
16% 
14% 
6% 
6% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
 
Inadequate assistance  
Deviation from standard techniques   
Inexperience  
Error of judgement 
Distraction  
Inadequate communication  
Failure to check  
Unfamiliar environment  
Unfamiliar procedure or equipment 
Wrong technique chosen 
 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Decision Making 
Situation Awareness 
Team Working 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Decision Making 
Beckmann et al., 2001 
(5) 
 
Incident reporting forms of 
reintubations (143 incidents 
and 258 contributory 
factors) 
 
165 54% 
20% 
18% 
8% 
Error of judgement 
Problem recognition   
Inadequate patient assessment  
Inadequate training  
 
Decision Making 
Situation Awareness 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Bracco et al., 2001 
(8) 
Incident reporting forms 
(777 incidents and 777 
contributory factors) 
241 37% 
32% 
31% 
 
Failure to execute plan as intended  
Surveillance errors   
Application of inappropriate plan   
 
Task Management 
Situation Awareness 
Decision Making 
 
Beckmann et al., 2003 
(4) 
 
Incident reporting forms  
and medical chart review 
(211 incidents and 224  
contributory factors) 
83 17% 
14% 
12% 
10% 
10% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
Communication problem  
Inattention or absent mindedness 
Failure to check equipment 
Poor teamwork 
Inexperience or Inadequate training  
Inappropriate behaviour or action  
Pressure to proceed 
Lack of supervision  
Taking short cuts  or breaking rules 
Failure to provide/enforce protocol or policy  
 
Team Working 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Task Man. / Team Wk 
 
Beckmann et al., 2004 
(6) 
 
Incident reporting forms 
identifying cases of intra-
hospital transfers  (191 
incidents and 900 
contributory factors) 
 
355 16% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
9% 
9% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
3% 
Error of problem recognition 
Error of judgement   
Communication problem 
Failure to follow protocol 
Inadequate training 
Patient preparation inadequate 
Patient assessment inadequate 
Failure to check equipment  
Inexperience 
Lack of supervision 
Distraction / inattention 
 
Situation Awareness 
Decision Making 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Situation Awareness 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Situation Awareness 
Graf et al., 2005 
(23) 
Incident reporting forms (50 
incidents and 81 
contributory factors) 
69 19% 
16% 
15% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
9% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
 
Disregard of standards, rules and orders 
Communication insufficiency, misunderstanding 
Drug given but not prescribed 
Wrong, incomplete or / delayed echocardiographic assessment 
Delayed intervention 
Wrong dose 
Lack of experience 
Wrong, incomplete or / delayed electrocardiographic assessment 
Wrong diagnosis 
Order illegible 
 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Sit Aware / Task Man. 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Sit Aware / Task Man. 
Situation Awareness 
Team Working 
Rothschild et al., 2005  
(30) 
 
Observations, incident 
reporting forms, 
computerised ADE detection 
monitors and medical chart 
review (277 incidents 329 
contributory factors) 
295 57% 
17% 
13% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
Medication error in ordering or execution of treatment 
Failure to take precautions or follow protocol to prevent accidental injury 
Inadequate reporting/communication 
Avoidable delays in diagnosis 
Inadequate patient assessment 
Inadequate training / supervision 
Inadequate reporting or communication 
Avoidable treatment delay 
Failure to check equipment or defective equipment 
Task Management 
Task Management 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Situation Awareness 
Task Man. / Team Wk 
Team Working 
Task Management 
Task Management 
 
Total 2677 incidents (5610 
contributory factors) 
2401    
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Figure 3. The proportion of contributory factors across all studies (see table 1) that each of the four non-
technical skill categories accounts for. 
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